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ABSTRACT
Recent research suggests that an Income Equalisation Deposit (lED) scheme could be a feasible new
risk management tool for commercial farmers in South Africa. This prompted a study of practicing
consultants' (tax experts) views on the viability of an IED scheme, how it would relate to existing
tax provisions for farmers, and what types offarmers would be likely to use the scheme. Twenty-four
consultants based mainly in KwaZulu-Natal, and in the Maize Triangle and surrounding areas
(North-West Province, North-Eastern Free State and Mpumalanga), were surveyed in 2000 using
mail documents comprising ofa questionnaire and a scenario section. Each consultant was asked to
answer eight questions that were compiled to obtain information on whether practicing tax
consultants think an IED scheme would be viable for commercial farmers in South Africa, whether
they would recommend it to their clients, and their perceptions ofhow it would fit with existing tax
provisions for farmers and, the tax deferral effects of such a scheme
Consultants were then asked to review nine scenarios of typical farms in the study regions and to
decide whether they would recommend an IED scheme for each scenario. A statistical experimental
design was used to structure the scenarios, allowing for main and interaction effects between
variables that could influence the potential use of an IED scheme by commercial farmers in South
Africa. These farms were depicted using four variables that showed different levels offarm business
leverage (debt/asset ratio), net farm income, business risk (index ofnet farm income variability), and
off-farm income, based on representative farm record data supplied by the National Department of
Agriculture. Discriminant analysis (n=192) was used to estimate which of the four variables best
distinguished between scenario farms that the consultants would and would not consider as likely
users of an IED scheme.
Consultants perceived that the scheme could be feasible, help farmers to avoid over-capitalising
during years of good cash flow, and provide liquidity in "lean" times. Most ofthem would support
recommendations that the Land Bank drought relief scheme for livestock farmers be replaced with
an lED scheme that all farmers could access. They also felt that the capital expenditure and
accumulated depreciation allowance provisions available to farmers should remain in place. In the
consultants' view, farmers with higher annual net farm incomes (>R300 000), lower debt!asset ratios
«15%), more variable net farm incomes, and less off-farm income would more likely use an lED
scheme. In terms of ranking, ceteris paribus, high risk maize farmers, intermediate risk maize
farmers and high risk livestock farmers are more likely to use an lED than are low risk maize
farmers, low and intermediate risk livestock farmers, and diversified farmers. Since maize farmers
have been the main beneficiaries ofpast government drought aid, this could mean reduced demands
on government drought relief funds in future if an lED scheme is introduced.
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INTRODUCTION
Farmers operate and make decisions in an uncertain environment characterised by business and
fmancial risk (Gabriel and Baker, 1980). More variable product prices following agricultural
marketing deregulation, drought, and more variable nominal interest rates, are recent examples of
such risks in South Africa. These risks lead to income variability, especially in the grain sectors
where widespread droughts are common. Past South African government response to drought
mainly involved providing drought relief, culminating in R3.8 billion worth of assistance - mostly
to maize farmers - in 1992/93 (Willemse, 1992 p15). Since 1994, the South African government has
changed this policy and has encouraged farmers to manage risks themselves, in order to reduce
demands on government funds. One option currently being proposed to the National Department
of Agriculture (NDA, 1997) is an Income Equalisation Deposit (lED) scheme. An lED could
provide a reserve fund in which farmers invest part of their income during "good"] years, and then
are taxed on this income only when they withdraw the money for use in "bad,,2 years. In this way,
the lED would operate as a risk management tool to help stabilise farm incomes.
In a progressive income tax structure, taxpayers with fluctuating incomes are more likely to have a
greater tax liability than taxpayers with relatively stable incomes. Thus, taxpayers with comparable
incomes over a time period may not be treated similarly and tax equity may not be achieved.
Because of this, South African farmers can elect to be taxed at a rate that is based on a moving
average income. However, this tax instrument does not promote better cash flow and better risk
I A "good" year is defined as a high annual net income year before tax set-offs.
2A "bad" year is defmed as a low annual net income year before tax set-offs.
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management as the farmer is not provided with additional incentives to save in good years and to be
better prepared for the "lean" years. The drought relief provision (paragraph BA of the First
Schedule of the Income Tax Act) provides some drought reliefto livestock farmers, but no scheme
is available to crop farmers who are more vulnerable to droughts.
The establishment ofan IED scheme is not a new issue in South Africa since it was first considered
in 1951, put forward again in 1960, and later proposed in 1979 and 1987 (RSA, 1951; 1979 and
1987). The scheme was seen as a means of stabilising farm incomes, acting as a risk management
tool. The recommendation was rejected in all cases. The government and all commissions involved
were not convinced of the feasibility of the proposed scheme stating it was open to serious
objections. Criticisms included (1) it leads to tax deferral, (2) the current income averaging scheme
also allows farmers to provide for poor years via tax savings in good years, and (3) the scheme may
be misused in conjunction with the current income averaging scheme that has an in-out option, to
destabilise income and reduce tax (Lamont, 1990 p41 0).
More recently, the use ofan IED scheme as a tax instrument to promote improved cash flow and risk
management has been considered by many, focusing primarily on the tax implications (Lamont,
1990; NDA, 1997 and Fuchs, 1999). Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000), however, perceived that the
economic feasibility ofsuch a scheme had not been fully researched and the economic environment
had changed considerably over the years making the scheme more attractive. Most crop insurance
schemes had collapsed, deregulation had lead to an increase in uncertainty and real interest rates
became positive creating more of an incentive to save. In light of these events, the economic
feasibility of introducing an IED scheme in South Africa was evaluated by Nieuwoudt and Howell
(2000). They suggested that the proposed scheme could be feasible in the South African situation,
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promoting better cash flow and risk management over time. This study reports on a postal survey
which was conducted amongst 24 South African tax consultants (experts) in 2000. It complements
Nieuwoudt and Howell's study by researching whether practicing tax consultants consider an IED
scheme to be viable for commercial farmers in South Africa. It reports on whether they would
recommend it to their clients, their perceptions ofhow it would fit with existing tax provisions for
farmers, the tax deferral effects, and what types of farmers are likely to use an IED. Discriminant
analysis was conducted to identify and rank factors that distinguish between potential adopters and
non-adopters of an lED scheme. The responses could assist consultants and farmers in the
management of their operations toward becoming self-sufficient by being more liquid and better
prepared to handle risk.
Chapter one reviews literature on IED scheme proposals in South Africa, providing a briefhistory
with emphasis on the criticisms ofthe scheme in the past and current evaluations ofthese criticisms.
Chapter two presents current tax provisions available to commercial farmers in South Africa,
providing a brief discussion on each provision. Chapter three describes the research methodology
used in the study, and Chapter four presents the survey results from the questionnaire and
discriminant analysis. Chapter five concludes with a discussion on the policy implications of the
results, with future research options considered.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND HISTORY OF lED PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
This chapter provides an overview ofpast IED scheme proposals in South Africa. In addition, a brief
overview of the current Australian scheme is presented and briefly discussed. The Australian
scheme is discussed as it operates in a similar way to the proposed IED scheme in South Africa.
1.1 Past reviews of lED schemes in South Africa
The establishment of an IED scheme in South Africa was initially considered by the Steyn
Committee in 1951 (RSA, 1951). The Committee recommended against its introduction as other
forms ofthe industry were also subjected to income variations. In 1960, the De Swart Study Group
on Agricultural Credit recommended IED' s as a means to counter excessive capital expenditure and
consequent financial difficulties of farmers. The principle was not accepted. In 1979, the Jacobs
Committee supported IED schemes in principle, but did not consider themselves to have the
expertise to evaluate the practical implications of the proposal (RSA, 1979). The proposal was
referred to the Standing Commission of Taxation and the Commission for Inland Revenue who
found the IED scheme was open to serious objections. The government (RSA, 1982) accepted the
recommendations of the Standing Commission that the scheme be rejected. Finally, the Margo
Commission recommended against the use ofIED's in 1987 (RSA, 1987), commenting that an IED
scheme, whether as a complement to or a replacement of the current averaging scheme, should not
be implemented.
4




The implementation of lED's would result in greater stability in the
agricultural sector, which due to the nature of its production circumstances
is subject to income and production variations from year to year.
lED's will enable farmers to overcome crises and setbacks on their own,
which improve the extent of independence and the image of agriculture in
general.
The greater degree ofstability which the system will effect together with the
fact that farmers will be able to help themselves to a larger extent during
adverse times, will reduce the extent ofassistance rendered to agriculture by
the government.
(d) Efficiency. Income fluctuations and the bunching of investment expenditure will be
smoothed, allowing for more efficient resource allocation.
(e) Administration. If funds are deposited at a bank, the scheme will be easy to administer. If
funds are deposited at the Land and Agricultural Bank ofSouth Africa, "lED
certificates" could be issued when deposits are made and supply the
Department ofInland Revenue with duplicates for record-keeping purposes.
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Major criticisms ofIED schemes in the past are presented below, with recommendations provided
by Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000):
(a) An IED scheme will favour the rich (Hatlingh, 1986) and indications are that a small
percentage of farmers would be able to use an IED scheme (RSA, 1987).
Current deposits in the drought relief scheme for livestock sales (paragraph 13A) are
estimated at just over R200 million and the number of investors has increased three-fold
since the Margo Commission enquiry. This indicates that deposits will not be insignificant
if an IED scheme is adopted and caters for both crops and livestock.
(b) The scheme impinges on the sound principle that revenue should be taxed in the year in
which it accrues (RSA, 1987),.
Farmers cannot benefit from deferred taxes while the funds are deposited as they cannot
access these funds. Tax deferral can also be limited by specifying a time limit on holding
deposits. This principle has already been ignored under the drought reliefmeasure provided
by the Land Bank.
(c) There are many other sectors of the economy which suffer vagaries of fluctuating markets,
sales and income. To make an exception for farming would be indefensible if others were
refused (Lamont, 1990 p409).
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Agricultural risk has different components which distinguish it from risk in other sectors.
The first component is the risk arising from adverse weather which affects vast areas
simultaneously. This is common in South African agriculture. The second component is the
severity of the risk when compared to North America and Europe where a 30% decline in
corn production is seen as a disaster. A decline ofmore than 60% in maize production is not
uncommon in South Africa. Lastly, the farmer has little control over his environment and
often has little scope to diversify. This is especially true in the cropping areas of South
Africa. Other sectors may experience risk, but more opportunities are available to spread
business risks.
(d) Current averaging schemes lend themselves well to enable farmers in good years to make
provision for poorer years by means of a tax saving (Lamont, 1990 p409).
These concessions, [paragraph 15 (3) (plantation farming) and paragraph 19 (2) (average
taxable income)ofthe First Schedule of the Income Tax Act. No 58 of 1962 (Huxham and
Haupt, 2000)], provide the farmer with some tax relief and removes some of the incentives
to overcapitalise in "good" years. However, these concessions provide no incentive to the
farmer to make provision for "bad" years.
(e) An excessively high tax burden could result on the death ofa taxpayer (RSA, 1987). Since
it is only logical that a person cannot continue to be a taxpayer after his death, the Income
Tax Act requires that a deceased person shall be taxed on all income received by or accruing
to him up to and including the date of his death. The total amount to his credit on that date
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in the proposed reserve fund and not yet taxed, would therefore have to be taxed at that stage
and, if it was a large amount, an excessively high tax burden could result.
This tax burden has also been ignored as livestock farmers are given the same concession
under the drought relief measure provided by the Land Bank.
(t) The scheme offers considerable scope for tax sheltering and can be misused. There is
nothing preventing a farmer depositing non-farm income into lED's and withdrawing it as
part of farm income (RSA, 1987 and Lamont, 1990 p410).
If a rule is applied that no funds may be deposited in an lED scheme if current taxable
income is below the moving average taxable income, misuse ofthe scheme for tax sheltering
purposes could be avoided.
Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000) emphasized two determining factors pertaining to the feasibility of
introducing an lED scheme in South Africa. One factor, briefly discussed in the criticisms, relates
to the misuse of an lED scheme and the second factor relates to the implementation of an lED
scheme.
If farmers have access to both an in-out tax provision and an lED scheme, they may use the scheme
to deliberately destabilise income to obtain tax advantages. The problem arises when funds are
deposited in low income years to bring down the tax rate even further. This practice could be
avoided by enforcing a rule that funds cannot be deposited in an lED scheme in the current year if
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actual taxable income in that year is below the moving average taxable income. This rule would
require no additional information for tax purposes as the current income averaging concession uses
information on both average and current taxable income (Nieuwoudt and Howell, 2000).
It may be possible to replace the livestock drought relief scheme (paragraph BA) with an IED
scheme and have one scheme that caters for both livestock and crop farmers. This implies that
deposits can be made only if current taxable income is above the moving average taxable income.
This will still allow livestock farmers to make deposits into this fund during drought conditions as
incomes will be above the moving average (Nieuwoudt and Howell, 2000).
1.2 Present (2000) lED provisions in Australia
The Australian Government introduced IED's in 1976 with the aim of encouraging farmers to
stabilise their incomes. They were intended to provide farmers with a "self-help" means ofhandling
income instability. Besides the small usage, a number of developments reduced the attractiveness
ofIED's which resulted in the introduction ofa new scheme in 1983. The new scheme was intended
to provide an incentive for farmers to set aside in good years money for use in bad years. The
introduction of the in-out option and the lifting of the deposit limit had a number of consequences
which contributed to the repeal of the IED scheme. Reasons for the repeal will be discussed.
(a) The interaction ofthe averaging scheme and the IED scheme produced anomalous results
whereby a tax benefit could be gained by farmers deliberately destabilising their taxable
income by lodging deposits in low income years and withdfaw them in high income years
(RSA, 1987; Larnont, 1990 p369).
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(b) Since monies deposited in the IED scheme could be derived from any source (other than
investment income), methods existed that enabled some weaknesses in the averaging scheme
to be exploited.
The present IED scheme in Australia is called a Farm Management Deposit Scheme (FMD). FMD's
have the same purpose as IED schemes, namely to encourage farmers to save money in "good" years
for use in "bad" years. FMD' s provide an important risk management tool to help farmers deal with
uneven income streams common in Australian agriculture due to climate and market risks. Deposits
into an FMD are not regarded as taxable income in the year ofdeposit, but are taxable when money
is withdrawn. FMD's provide a tax linked savings tool for farmers which can complement other risk
management strategies such as forward selling and futures contracts. Deposits can be made at a
financial institution that meets the government's prudential requirements and interest is paid at the
commercial rate offered by the institution. On withdrawal, a tax is deducted at marginal rates. It is
expected that the scheme will result in an increase in savings levels by farmers, at the same time
reducing the tendency to financially over-gear farming operations. It is also expected that farmers
holding deposits in FMD's will be regarded as having better risk profiles, which could have a
beneficial impact on borrowing costs. Significant tax savings from the use of FMD's may be
comparatively rare (Neilson, 1999 p3-4).
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CHAPTER 2
TAX PROVISIONS IN SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
Currently, there are a number of special tax provisions available to commercial farmers in South
Africa. These provisions were designed to reduce the impact ofdisasters on farm income, assist with
abnormal receipts of farm income, assist in the purchasing of capital items, and reduce the tax
liability of livestock on hand. These provisions are presented and discussed in this chapter.
2.1 Anti-bunching measures
The anti-bunching provisions in the First Schedule of the Act, the thrust of which is to ignore
abnormal receipts in the calculation of the rate of tax, are as follows (Huxham and Haupt, 2000):
(i) paragraphs 13 and BA (forced and drought relief provisions)
(ii) paragraph 15(3) (plantations)
(iii) paragraph 17 (sugar cane)
(iv) paragraph 20 (profit in consequence of acquisition of land by the State and other
bodies)
2.1.1 Forced sales of livestock (paragraph 13)
Paragraph 13 provides relief for a farmer who has been forced to sell livestock due to drought,
disease, plague or fire. If livestock is replaced within four years after the end of the year of
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assessment in which the livestock was sold, the fanner has the option of deducting the cost of the
replacement stock from his income in the year of assessment in which the forced sale took place or
deducting it from the income in the year in which the replacement livestock is purchased. The claim
for a deduction must be made within five years after the close ofthe year ofassessment during which
the livestock was sold. (Huxham and Haupt, 2000).
Ifthe farmer purchases livestock to replace stock which was sold in tenns ofa government livestock
reduction scheme, the same provisions apply, except that the farmer has nine years to replace the
stock. The farmer may not elect to use this paragraph if he is taxed in tenns ofparagraph 19 (rating
fonnula for fanners) in the year that the livestock is sold. In this case, the claim for a deduction must
be made within ten years (Huxham and Haupt, 2000).
2.1.2 Drought relief provision (paragraph 13A)
Ifa farmer receives proceeds from the sale ofhis livestock because ofdrought and has deposited the
proceeds or a portion of the proceeds with the Land Bank within three months of receiving the
proceeds, the proceeds so deposited, will not be included in his gross income. If at any time within
six months after the end ofthe year ofthe sale, the fanner withdraws the money from the Land Bank,
he will be taxed as ifthe concession in this paragraph did not apply. Ifhe withdraws the money after
the end of the six month period (above), but before six years have passed from the end ofthe (tax)
year of sale, he will be taxed on the withdrawal. Ifhe leaves the money on deposit for six years or
more, it will be deemed to be his gross income on the last day of the six year period and if he dies
or goes insolvent within the six year period, the money still on deposit will be deemed to be his gross
income on the day before his death or insolvency (Huxham and Haupt, 2000).
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2.1.3 Plantation farming (paragraph 15(3»
If a farmer (other than a close corporation or company) derives taxable income from disposal of
plantations of forest produce, and this income -exceeds the annual average taxable income from
plantations for the preceding three years, then according to paragraph 15(3), the excess (actual minus
annual average) is subject to tax in terms of the rating formula in section 5(10) of the Act. The
farmer is thus taxed on his actual income at a rate derived from his average income. The section
5(10) formula (taken from Huxham and Haupt, 2000 p194) is as follows:
y= (B+D~C+L)x(B-L))+(LXR)
Y = Normal tax to be determined before rebates are deducted, and before transition levy (if
applicable) is added.
A = Normal tax (before the deduction ofany rebate and before the addition (ifapplicable) of any
transition levy) calculated for taxable income of"B + D - © + L)".
B = Taxable income for the year.
C = Excess plantation taxable income (actual less previous three years' average).
L = Lump sums from retirement accrued on or after 1 September 1995.
D = RAF contributions based on Land C.
R = Relevant rate of taxation.
13
2.1.4 Sugar cane destroyed by fire (paragraph 17)
Paragraph 17 of the Act, as adapted from Lamont (1990 p398) and Huxham and Haupt (2000),
provides that where sugar cane has been sold by a farmer, other than a company, because the sugar
cane fields have been damaged by fire, taxable income from such sale shall be taxed in accordance
with the rating provisions in section 5(10). In this instance "C" in the formula in section 5(10) is
equal to so much of the taxable income derived from the disposal of sugar cane as a result of fire in
the cane fields, which but for such fire would not have been derived by the farmer in that year. If
the farmer is taxed on his annual average income per paragraph 19 in that year, paragraph 17 will
not apply. A farmer who is not taxed under the general rating formula (paragraph 19) may rate both
his sugar cane income (paragraph 17) and his plantation income (paragraph 15(3».
2.1.5 Sale of land to the State and other bodies (paragraph 20)
Paragraph 20 provides that if a farmer's land is acquired or expropriated by the State or any other
specified body and as a result discontinues his farming operations, he may apply to be subjected to
tax on a special basis on the abnormal profits he derives in the year of the acquisition/expropriation
ofhis farm or in two tax years succeeding the year ofacquisition. Ifthe farmer qualifies, his excess
farming profit is taxed at a rate ofnine percent (12 percent ifunmarried). The excess farming profit
may consist of excess livestock profit or excess plantation profit. The excess livestock profit is an
amount by which current livestock profit exceeds average livestock profit for a period not exceeding
five years. Excess plantation farming profit represents abnormal plantation profit, but is limited to
the difference between the total taxable income from plantation farming and the average taxable
income from plantation farming for the three years prior to the current year (Huxham and Haupt,
2000).
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2.1.6 Discussion of anti-bunching measures
According to Fuchs (1999) paragraph 13 (forced sales of livestock) can be seen as a positive
incentive for farmers to take actions to reduce the impact of the drought because as soon as the
farmer has purchased livestock to replace the livestock sold before the drought, the assessment is
revised and a refund is made. This refund could assist the farmer to finance restocking. The ultimate
benefit to the farmer is however uncertain. Ifrates oftax are lower in the year when restocking takes
place than in the year in which the bulk sales took place a saving in tax may result if the farmer
decides to make an election in terms of paragraph 13 of the Act. On the other hand, if rates of tax
have increased, the farmer may be worse off if he makes the election.
The impact which the forced sale oflivestock (due to drought) and the restocking to replace those
livestock has on taxable income is being eliminated to a large extent. The farmer should therefore
be in a similar position to which he would have been had it never been necessary to sell and restock
livestock due to droughts. There is, however, a timing effect. The farmer needs to establish well
in advance as to which year the provision will be made applicable, the year oflivestock sales or the
year ofrestocking. The farmer must take note that an application must be submitted to effect the tax
revision in the applicable year ofhis choice. Cash flow problems might arise ifthe farmer replaces
stock before his tax has been revised and a refund is made (Fuchs, 1999).
According to Fuchs (1999), paragraph BA (drought relief provision) could be seen as a positive
incentive for farmers to take actions to reduce the impact ofdrought because the provision ofthe Act
allows farmers to deposit proceeds ofthe sale oflivestock due to drought in an account in his name
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with the South African Land Banle To the extent that proceeds are deposited with the South African
Land Bank, they are deemed not to be gross income derived by the farmer for that year. The
provisions mentioned, effectively prevent a farmer from postponing the taxation ofthe proceeds of
the disposal of livestock disposed of on account of drought for a year simply by placing those
proceeds on deposit with the Land Bank for a short period ending less than 6 months after the end
ofthe year ofassessment in which those proceeds were derived. It was, however, noted that no such
provisions are available for crop farmers who are more severely impacted by droughts (Fuchs, 1999;
NDA, 1997). According to NDA (2000), dry land crop farmers are more vulnerable to the effects
of seasonal and disastrous droughts than livestock farmers.
It is in the writers opinion that paragraphs 15(3) (plantation farming), 17 (sugar cane destroyed by
fire) and 20 (sale of land to the State and other bodies) do go some way to assist farmers with
abnormal receipts oftaxable income, but provide no incentive to farmers to become more liquid and
better prepared to handle risk.
2.2 Average taxable income (paragraph 19(2))
The farmer's average taxable income from farming is calculated as follows (adapted from Huxham
and Haupt, 2000). The aggregate of the current year's taxable income from farming, plus the
previous four-year's taxable income from farming, is divided by five to arrive at an average. If the
farmer has farmed for less than four years prior to the current year, the average is taken over as many
years as he has farmed. According to the rating formula in section 5(10), the farmer pays tax on his
actual (current) income at a rate based on his average income. In this instance "C" in the formula
in section 5(10) is the amount by which the farmer's taxable income from fanping for the year
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exceeds his average taxable income from farming. If actual farming income is lower than the
average farming income, tax will be paid on actual income. In the latter case, the tax rate is based
on actual income and not on average income. Paragraph 13 (forced sales oflivestock), paragraph
15(3) (plantation farming) and paragraph 17 (sugar cane destroyed by fire) may be used if actual
income is lower than the average income, ifapplicable. If the farmer has a loss from farming in the
current year, the provisions of paragraph 19 (rating formula for farmers) obviously cannot apply.
2.2.1 Discussion of average taxable income
According to the Margo Commission (RSA, 1987) the averaging provision had several advantages:
it is well understood by taxpayers and administered with relative ease, it is well integrated with other
features of the law, and it confers substantial benefits upon farmers in that they can never pay more
tax than other taxpayers with the same taxable income and often pay less. Assistance via averaging,
however, is seen as creating inequity as only those with fluctuating incomes benefit.
The current South African averaging provision includes an in-out option that automatically releases
a farmer from the provision when farm income is below the average income. Averaging, therefore,
applies only when taxable income is greater than average income. This option was introduced to
alleviate the problem of taxpayers being subject to burdensome tax liabilities in years when they
have little or no income. The in-out option means that farmers are favoured by the taxation system
in the sense that the tax rate is reduced below: that of the tax rate of the moving average income
(RSA, 1987). According to Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000), the averaging provision as a risk
management strategy provides the farmer with some tax relief in a bad year as his tax rate is
calculated on his actual income in that year, and not on his higher moving average income.
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2.3 Capital expenditure
The deduction ofcapital expenditure is permitted in the determination oftaxable income. However,
according to the South African Revenue Services (SARS, 2000), the Act provides that the deduction
in this respect in any year shall not exceed the farmer's taxable income from farming operations in
respect of that year, and the amount by which such expenditure exceeds such income in that year
shall be carried forward and be deducted in succeeding years, subject to the same limitation. A
farmers' capital expenditure is deducted either in full (subject to certain limits) under the provisions
ofparagraph 12 ofthe First Schedule (capital development expenditure), or as a special depreciation
allowance under section 128.
2.3.1 Capital development expenditure (paragraph 12(1»
The following expenditure is allowed as a deduction in determining the taxable income ofa farmer
(adapted from Huxham and Haupt, 2000), ie. expenditure incurred during the year ofassessment in
respect of:
(a) eradication of noxious plants;
(b) prevention of soil erosion;
(c) dipping tanks
(d) dams, irrigation schemes, boreholes and pumping plants;
(e) fences;
(t) erection of, or extensions, additions or improvements (not repairs) to, buildings used in
connection with farming operations other than those used for domestic purposes ofpersons
who are not employees of such farmer;
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(g) planting oftrees, shrubs, perennial plants for the production ofgrapes or other fruit, nuts, tea,
coffee, hops, sugar, vegetable oils or fibres, and the establishment of any area used for the
planting of such trees, shrubs or plants;
(h) building of roads and bridges used in connection with farming operations;
(i) carrying of electric power from the main transmission lines to the farm apparatus.
Amounts under (a) and (b) are deductible in full in the year of assessment while limitations are
placed on the amount allowed for on other items.
2.3.2 Machinery, implements, utensils and articles - special depreciation allowance (section
12B)
Any machinery, implements, utensils or articles (other than livestock), acquired by a farmer and
brought into use by him for the first time on or after 1 July 1998, are subject to a depreciation
allowance on the cash cost of the asset. The allowance is claimable on new as well as used assets.
The asset must be used by the farmer in the carrying on of his farming operations in order for the




First year of use:
Second year:
Third year:
50% of such cost
30% of such cost
20% of such cost
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2.3.3 Discussion of capital expenditure provisions
Prior to the implementation ofsection 12B, the Margo Commission (RSA, 1987) received numerous
submissions on farming taxation during its investigation, ofwhich many argued that the concession
of paragraph 12(1); (a) encouraged the bunching of farm investment expenditures, particularly in
high income years as many farmers make management and investment decisions purely on tax
considerations; detrimentally affected rural towns and supply industries, this view was supported by
Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000); (b) encouraged a propensity to spend rather than to save, which more
often than not results in overcapitalisation and an exacerbation of cash flow problems; and (c)
effectively benefitted only larger-scale farmers. The latter view was supported by Hattingh (1986
p21). A few submissions, however, argued that this capital expenditure provision should remain in
place to encourage productivity and farmers in a start-up situation.
On evaluation ofthe submissions, the Margo Commission (RSA, 1987) believed that the criticisms
applied particularly to the acquisition ofplant and machinery, which assets represent approximately
two thirds of agricultural investments (excluding farm land). The commission consequently
introduced section 12B with the hope of generating a more neutral tax system and to ensure that
investment decisions in agriculture were determined by real profitability. Nieuwoudt and Howell
(2000) reported that the section 12B provision allowed farmers to bring down their income tax in
good years by purchasing capital items; the farmers' disposable income is higher with these high
depreciation rates; and in the absence of these high depreciation rates, the farmer may have
postponed the purchase ofcapital items. It was also noted that since the farmer can elect to be taxed
on an average income, the tax rate will not be higher in a good year and most of the tax advantages
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from over-capitalisation in good years may thus disappear as the farmer does not face high marginal
tax rates in such a year.
Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000) estimated the impact of farm income variations on the purchase of
durable capital assets (farm tractors and machinery) using data from 1976 to 1999. It was shown that
the real purchases of tractors and machinery were negatively related to real prices of the item and
positively related to gross income ofcrops and horticultural products. Better liquidity management
and potential tax advantages were postulated as possible reasons for an increase in input purchases
in good years.
2.4 Stock values
There are a number of paragraphs that apply to a farmer when accounting for stock (livestock and
produce) for income tax purposes. The tax concession comes by way of using standard values
(paragraph 5) in reporting closing stock instead of using market related values.
2.4.1 Valuation of closing stock in respect of livestock (paragraph 5)
According to Huxham and Haupt (2000), a farmer must include the opening and closing stock of
livestock in his income tax return. All animals used by a farmer in his farming operations are
included in livestock and all closing stock oflivestock is valued at standard values. Standard values
are much lower than market values, and are fixed by regulation in terms of the Act. The standard
values oflivestock are provided in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Standard values of livestock as permitted by the SARS, 2000
Cattle Horses
- Bull R50 - Stallions, over 4 years R40
- Ox R40 - Mares, over 4 years R30
-Cow R40 - Geldings, over 3 years R30
Tollies and Heifers - Colts and fillies, 3 years RIO
- 1 to 2 years R14 - Colts and fillies, 2 years R8
- 2 to 3 years R30 - Colts and fillies, 1 year R6
- Calves R4 - Foals, under 1 year R2
Sheep Donkeys
- Wethers R6 - Jacks, over 3 years R4
-Rams R6 - Jacks, under 3 years R2
- Ewes R6 - Jennies, over 3 years R4
- Weaned lambs R2 - Jennies, under 3 years R2
Goats Mules
- Weaned kids R2 - 4 years and older R30
- Fully grown R4 - 3 years R20
Pigs - 2 years R14
- Under 6 months (weaned) R6 - 1 year R6
- Over 6 months R12 Ostriches, fully grown R6
Poultry, over 9 months RI Chinchillas, all ages RI
Source: Adapted from Huxham and Haupt (2000)
2.4.2 Discussion of standard values for livestock
According to Lamont (1990 p301), standard values were generally introduced as a means to simplify
income measurement and to avoid the impracticability ofother bases ofvaluation, particularly cost.
The Steyn Committee (RSA 1951 p7l) reported on the harmful effects of the standard values for
livestock. Stock which would otherwise find its way on to the market would be withheld causing
stock prices to become inflated, to the detriment of the consumer, land becomes overstocked, land
prices are forced up due to farmers purchasing additional land to accommodate livestock purchased
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with this object in view and, the farmer himself in the long run gets into still greater taxation
difficulties from which he is unable to extricate himself. Russell (1987 p7) reported that standard
values has led to the distortion of investment patterns, and the Ross Committee (NZ, 1967 p300)
reported that standard values create a "lock-in" factor which discourages existing farmers to convert
their livestock to cash.
Following the presentation and discussion oftax provisions available to commercial farmers in this
chapter, it is apparent that these provisions do go some way in assisting farmers in their farming
operations. These provisions can help reduce the impact of disasters on farm income, assist with
abnormal receipts of farm income, assist in the purchasing of capital items which are relatively
costly, and reduce the tax liability of livestock on hand. It must, however, be noted that these
provisions do not provide an incentive for farmers to become more liquid and better prepared to
handle risk. According to Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000), the improvement ofagricultural cash flow
through a risk management strategy, such as an IED scheme, could benefit the rural sector and its
support activities by means of income stabilisation. The next chapter deals with the research




Following the review on tax provisions in South Africa, this chapter describes the survey conducted
amongst South African consultant firms. The objectives of the study were two-fold. The first
objective was to determine whether there is a need for an IED scheme and, ifthere is a need, how
the scheme should be implemented with regards to certain tax provisions available to commercial
farmers. The second objective was to determine what types offarmers are most likely to use an IED.
To achieve these objectives, a postal survey was conducted where documents consisting of a
questionnaire section and a scenario section were sent to consultants (tax experts). A pilot survey
was conducted with two consultants from different accounting firms to confirm the clarity and
realism ofthe questions and the scenarios before the survey was posted to participating consultants.
Consultants were approached as they deal directly with farmers, and farmers will most likely rely
on their advice. Discriminant analysis was conducted on data collected to determine which
explanatory variables best differentiate between potential adopters and non-adopters of an IED
scheme.
3.1 Data collection
Fifty-two consultants based mainly in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and in the Maize Triangle and
surrounding areas (North-West Province, North-Eastern Free State and Mpumalanga), were
surveyed. These areas were selected to obtain the views of consultants that dealt with tax matters
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for a range offarm situations, from relatively low risk livestock and diversified farmers in KZN (less
variable net farm incomes), to relatively high risk maize farmers (more variable net farm incomes)
in the Maize Triangle and adjacent regions. Owing to the design of the statistical model used to
construct the scenarios, a response rate of46% (24 consultants) was desired. Of the 52 consultants
contacted, only 14 responded, a rate of27%. Non-responsive consultants were sent a second set of
documents including an incentive. Consequently, with only four additional replies received,
appointments were made with six consultants in order to obtain the desired total of 24 responses.
The respondents were divided into the following strata:
Table 3.1: Strata of consultants (tax experts) who reported on the potential viability of an
lED scheme, 2000 (n=24)
3.2 Questionnaire section
The questionnaire section (see Appendix A, pg77, for original questionnaire) was compiled to obtain
information on whether practicing tax consultants consider an IED scheme to be viable for
commercial farmers in South Africa, whether they would recommend it to their clients, and their
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perceptions ofhow it would fit with existing tax provisions for farmers and, the tax deferral effects
of such a scheme. Each consultant was asked to answer eight questions on whether:
(1) an IED scheme was feasible, and whether they agreed with the concept of an IED;
(2) they would recommend an IED to farm clients;
(3) they recommend the Land Bank drought relief provision (Paragraph BA) to livestock farm
clients;
(4) they would support replacing the Paragraph BA provision with an IED scheme;
(5) the SARS would consider their liquidity shortfall due to tax deferral with an IED as a
problem;
(6) the accelerated depreciation allowance provision (Section 12B) and the capital expenditure
provision (paragraph 12(1)) should be used with an IED scheme, or whether these schemes
should be withdrawn;
(7) an IED scheme, if implemented, should be used with or without the income averaging
provision (Paragraph 19(2)), and
(8) they foresee any disadvantages if an IED scheme is implemented.
The questions were designed to:
(1) determine whether the scenarios were realistic for the purpose ofanalysis and to gain general
information relating to the concept and viability (need) of an IED scheme.
(2) obtain a relative estimate of the degree of use of an IED scheme.
(3) identify the gains perceived by consultants in using the Land Bank drought relief scheme
(paragraph 13 A), as this scheme operates in a similar way to the proposed IED scheme.
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(4) obtain information on implementing a scheme similar to the Land Bank drought relief
provision (paragraph 13A) that caters for all farmers, not only livestock farmers.
(5) gaininformation on problems potentially faced by the SARS as perceived by the consultants.
(6/7) establish details ofhow the proposed lED scheme should be implemented - whether certain
tax provisions available to farmers should be used in conjunction with an lED scheme or
withdrawn.
(8) obtain consultants impressions on any disadvantages foreseen with the implementation of
an lED scheme. This could provide information on any obstacles that would need to be
addressed.
3.3 Scenario section
The scenarios were compiled to determine what types of farmers are most likely to use an lED
scheme. Each consultant was asked to review nine scenarios of typical, farms in the study regions
and to decide whether they would recommend an lED scheme for each scenario. Scenarios one to
eight used in the analyses were constructed using a statistical experimental design, with the ninth
scenario serving as a control to measure the consistency between consultants. These scenarios
(farms) were depicted using four variables that showed different levels (high, low and intermediate)
of farm business leverage (debt/asset ratio), net farm income, business risk (net farm income
variability), and off-farm income, based on representative livestock, maize and diversified farm
record data supplied by the NDA (1999).
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Debt/asset ratios ranged from under 15 percent to over 40 percent, while net farm income ranged
from a low ofless than R50 000 per annum to a high ofover R300 000 per annum. Net farm income
was defmed as gross farm income less farm operating costs, excluding any rent, management salary
and interest on debt (foreign factor costs). Net farm income variability was used as a measure of
risk. For construction ofthe scenarios, net farm income variability was measured as an index ofnet
farm income variability. This index was shown for each year during 1995-1999 by expressing
annual net farm income in each year as a percentage of the average net farm income over the five-
year period. In this way, the index for high risk (high net farm income variability) maize farmers
(ranging from -30 to 276 around a mean of 100) showed far more net farm income variability than
the index for low risk livestock farmers (ranging from 58 to 124 around a mean of 100). Annual off-
farm incomes typically ranged from zero to a high of over R20 000 on the study area farms.
A typical set ofscenarios given to a particular consultant can be seen in Appendix B (pg81), and the
data set obtained from the scenario section can be seen in Appendix C (pg83). The high, low and
intermediate values of the four variables used in the survey are depicted below in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Respective values of variables used in the scenarios
Debt!Asset ratio
Annual off-fann income










1995 28 58 119
1996 201 116 89
1997 -30 124 III
1998 276 91 83
1999 25 III 97
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To enhance the simplicity of the survey, livestock net farm income variability was depicted using
a typical livestock farmer with a low index ofnet farm income variability. Likewise, maize net farm
income variability was depicted using a typical maize farmer with a high index of net farm income
variability. For analysis purposes, in order to cover all combinations ofnet farm income variability
with farming type, other than livestock and maize farmers with low and high levels of net farm
income variability respectively, the coefficient of variation in net farm income variability was
calculated using the original representative livestock, maize and diversified farm record data
supplied by the NDA (1999). In the analysis, high net farm income variability for a maize farmer
was measured using an index of net farm income variability but coded according to its coefficient
of variation of net farm income. Likewise, low net farm income variability for a livestock farmer
was measured using an index in net farm income variability, but coded according to its coefficient
of variation in net farm income. The function obtained separating potential IED scheme adopters
from non-adopters could then be used to determine the outcome ofdifferent enterprise combinations
with various levels of debt, off-farm income and net farm income.
Thus, for survey purposes, risk was measured in terms ofan index in net farm income variation. For
analysis purposes, risk was measured as an index ofnet farm income variability, but coded according
to the coefficient of variation in net farm income in order to determine the function and to exploit
all possible combinations of net farm income variability with farming type.
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a is the standard deviation
x is the mean
The following is an example ofhow the coefficient ofvariation was calculated for selected enterprise
and business risk combinations. For illustration purposes, the coefficient ofvariation for a livestock
farmer with a high net farm income variability will be calculated.
Table 3.3: Calculation of the standard deviation for a maize farmer depicting high
business risk (NDA, 2000)
1995 (XI) R143.088 36.47 1330.06
1996 (x2) R267.370 160.75 25840.56
1997 (x3) R48.749 -57.87 3348.94
1998 (x4) R47.575 -59.05 3486.9
1999 (xs) R26.329 -80.30 6488.09
Ix RI06.622 I~ 40494.55
Table 3.3 depicts the various steps performed in calculating the standard deviation from which the
coefficient of variation is derived. The raw annual net farm income data obtained over a five year
period is depicted in column two. Column three presents the product once the variable (x) ...xs) for
30
each year has been subtracted from the mean for the five year period. Column four depicts the
square ofthe value in column three, yielding the sum ofthe five year period. The standard deviation
is calculated by determining the square root of the sum (40494.55) in column four (201.23). The
coefficient of variation is thus:
(J 201 = 1.89
X 106.622
Coefficients of variation calculated for selected enterprise and net farm income variability
combinations are presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Coefficients of variation calculated for selected enterprise and business risk
combinations, data extrapolated from farm financial records supplied by the
NDA, 1999
Maize farmer - high net farm income variability
Livestock farmer - high net farm income variability
Maize farmer - intermediate net farm income variability
Livestock farmer - intermediate net farm income variability
Maize farmer - low net farm income variability











The scenarios to each consultant were constructed using the 25 factorial treatment set as presented
by Cochran and Cox (1957 p235). There were 32 different combinations for the five different
variables under consideration, each at two levels. These variables were:
A = Debt/asset ratio (low or high)
B = Annual off-farm income (low or high)
C = Annual net farm income (low or high)
D = Index of variation in net farm income (low or high)
E = Type of farming (livestock vs maize)
Three replications of the design were considered with four blocks (consultants) per replication. In
other words, each consultant was presented with a set ofeight different "financial record scenarios"
with the set of scenarios (blocks) being different for each consultant. The choice ofa block size of
eight permitted the partial confounding of 3-factor and 4-factor interactions with different effects
being confounded in each replication. The confounded effects in each ofthe three replications used
are summarised in Table 3.5.








By partially confounding 3-factor and 4-factor interactions, it was assumed that such interactions
would be less important than "main effects" and "2-factor" interactions. By presenting each
consultant with a different set of "financial record combinations", considered "blocks" in
experimental design terminology, possible differences between blocks (consultants) could be
eliminated statistically in the subsequent analyses. Halfway through the study it became apparent
that more data was required to separate the product effect (maize or livestock) from the risk effect.
The augmented data depicting 32 different scenarios for four blocks (consultants) for Replication
I, 11 and III are provided in Appendix D (pg92). It is to be noted that as additional consultants
became available the sets ofquestionnaires were repeated, with four consultants per replication. The
desired response was to cover all sets at least once (12 responses). If additional responses were
received, it would be optimal to cover all sets completely ie. 12 responses to 24 responses to 36
responses etc.
Analysis of the original data showed that the blocking effect of the design was not necessary and
therefore could be analysed as a simple random designed based on the 25 factorial treatment factor.
In the analysis of the augmented data the design structure was ignored.
3.5 Econometric technique employed in the empirical analysis
One econometric technique was employed in the data analysis. Discriminant models were estimated
to determine which explanatory variables best differentiate between potential adopters and non-
adopters ofan IED scheme. The object ofthis multivariate analysis was to generate information for
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policy purposes. This section provides a briefoverview ofthe technique followed by an explanation
of the variables considered in the models.
3.5.1 Discriminant analysis
Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique used to predict group membership. Linear
combinations of the independent, or predictor, variables are formed and serve as the basis for
grouping cases. In order to distinguish between these groups, the researcher must assemble a set of
explanatory or discriminating variables on which the two groups are expected to differ. On selecting
the discriminating variables, the mathematical objective is to weight and linearly combine the
variables so that the groups are forced to be as statistically distinct from one another as possible
(Klecka, 1980 p7; Norusis, 1994 pI).
The discriminant function is of the form:
Dj = BjXj + B2X2 + + Bp~ (3)
where: Dj is thei-th respondent's discriminant score on the function
Xj Xpare the values ofthe independent variables
Bj Bpare standardised coefficients estimated from the data
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The coefficients are computed so as to maximise the ratio of the variance of D between the two
groups relative to the variance ofD within groups. The index D is an optimum linear discriminator
between the groups. The relative contribution ofeach discriminating variable to the discriminating
function is determined by the magnitude ofits associated coefficient. The standardised coefficients
(Bp) reflect the relative importance of the independent variable QCp). Independent variables with
relatively large (Bp) contribute most to the discrimination between the two groups (Klecka, 1980
pI5-16; Norusis, 1994 p7). The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the variable is positively
or negatively related to D.
Upon the estimation of the discriminant function it is necessary to assess its discriminating power.
There are a number of statistics available for this estimation with the most important being the
eigenvalue, Wilks' Lambda, Chi-square, canonical correlation and F-statistic. The eigenvalue is a
direct measure of the function's discriminating power; the larger the value the better the
discriminating power of the function. The Wilks' Lambda provides a basis for verifying the
statistical significance ofthis function. With a range ofbetween zero and one, a value closer to zero
denotes a high level of discriminating power. Both the Chi-square and F-statistic indicate the way
in which the independent variables differentiate significantly between groups (ie: potential adopters
vs non-adapters), with a high value indicating a high level of significance. The canonical
correlation is a measure of the degree of association between the discriminant scores and group
membership. With a range ofbetween zero and one, a value closer to one denotes a good predictive
model. The explanatory power of a discriminant function can also be gauged by comparing its
classification of sample cases with actual group membership.
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Analysis refers to the interpretation ofthe original data, and to the interpretation ofthe discriminant
function. The F-test can be used to check whether or not the individual discriminating variables
contribute to the separation of groups (potential adopters and non-adopters). This test is valid only
if the explanatory variables are multivariate normally distributed (Truett et aI, 1967 p521).
According to Klecka (1980 p61), the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution (normality
assumption) is important for tests ofsignificance. In these tests, a statistical computed from a sample
is being compared to a theoretical probability distribution for that statistic. A theoretical distribution
can be computed by making some convenient mathematical assumptions, such as requiring that the
population meet the normality assumption. If the sample population does not satisfy this
requirement, the true sampling distribution for the statistic will be different from the theoretically
derived distribution. The difference between the two distributions may be very small or very large,
depending on the degree of deviation from the assumption.
The normality assumption is violated in the study by the dichotomous nature of the independent
variables. In practice, however, discriminant analysis is a rather robust which can tolerate some
deviation from the normality assumption. Violation ofthe assumption does not render the analysis
useless. Lachenbruch (1975 p 40-50) reviewed numerous discriminant studies and showed that the
discriminant function performs fairly well on such non-normal data. Inpractice, this assumption can
also be checked by observing the distribution of the discriminant scores (Dj) estimated for each
group. Ifthe distribution is approximately normal, the test is considered valid. According to Klecka
(1980 p62), in the interest of developing a mathematical model which can predict well or serve as
a reasonable description ofthe real world, the best guide is the percentage ofcorrect classifications.
Ifthis percentage is high, the violation ofany assumption was not very harmful. Efforts to improve
the data or use alternative formulas can give only marginal improvements.
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3.5.2 Variables considered and hypotheses
The variables which were expected to distinguish potential IED scheme adopters from non-adopters
are presented in Table 3.6 and discussed in this section. A dependent variable Y_N was constructed
using (1) for farmers for whom the consultant would recommend investing in an IED scheme and
(0) for farmers he would not recommend investing in an IED scheme.
Table 3.6: Defmition of variables considered for discriminant analysis
Y N = yes/no (1 for potential adopter; 0 for potential non-adopter)
DA = debt/asset ratio (dummy variable scoring 1 for high; 0 for low)
01 = off-farm income (dummy variable scoring I for high; 0 for low)
NFI = net farm income (dummy variable scoring 1 for high; 0 for low)
RISK = index of variation in net farm income (dummy variable scoring 2.630 for high; 0.523 for
low)
ENT = enterprise (dummy variable scoring 1 for livestock farmer; 0 for maize farmer)
R DA = index of variation in net farm income multiplied by debt/asset ratio (interaction variable)
Independent variables with their expected signs were as follows:
(i) Debt/asset ratio (-). This ratio was used as a measure of solvency. The critical issue relating
to leverage is the farm's ability to generate the cash to meet all expenses and service the debt
with an acceptable margin of safety. Due to the cost of borrowing being higher than the
interest rate earned on investing in an IED, it was expected that farmers with debt will
redeem debt first before investing in an IED scheme.
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(ii) Off-farm income (-). The off-farm income of a farming business serves as an additional
source offunds which can be used in the farming operation or invested outside ofagriculture.
It was hypothesised that higher levels of off-farm income may indicate clients that have
diversified investments and so would be less likely to need an lED. It was also hoped that
farmers with relatively higher off-farm incomes would not use the scheme as a perceived tax
shelter.
(iii) Net farm income (+). The net farm income ofa farm business is a reflection ofhow well the
business has performed. According to Barry et al (1995 p), the level of net farm income
reflected in the income statement is a meaningful absolute measure with which to monitor
profitability of the business from year to year. It was postulated that adopters would have
higher net farm incomes (higher profits) as they would have the means to save.
(iv) Index of variation in net farm income (+). This variable reflects the business risk inherent
in a particular enterprise. It was hypothesised that an lED scheme would suite farms having
a higher index of variation in net farm income variability as they are exposed to more
business risk. The introduction ofan lED scheme is primarily as a risk management tool and
it is therefore expected that farmers with a higher variation in income will make more use
of such a scheme. The conventional dummy variable scoring (1; 0) was weighted using a
coefficient of variation which provided a score of2.630 for a high index of variation in net
farm income and a score of 0.523 for a farmer with a low index of variation in net farm
mcome.
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(v) Enterprise (+). This variable was considered to capture the effects of relatively lower risk
livestock farmers (less variable net farm incomes) compared to relatively high risk maize
farmers (more variable net farm incomes). It was postulated that both livestock and maize
farmers would adopt an IED scheme, with the scheme being more valuable to the higher risk
maize farmers. Due to the design of the scenarios (maize farmers-high net farm income
variability, livestock farmers-low net farm income variability), the business risk experienced
by maize and livestock farmers is captured in both the ENT and RISK variable. As a result
of this relationship, perfect multicollinearity was expected between these two variables.
(vi) Risk - debt/asset ratio. This variable was constructed to determine whatthe combined effects
of risk and debt/asset ratio would have on the potential use of an IED scheme. The
relationship between the interaction effect R_DA and an IED scheme was not clear and for
this reason no hypotheses was presented. Farmers with a high combination ofrisk and debt
may be advised to first reduce their debt before investing in an IED scheme. This situation
would imply a negative relationship between the variable and an IED scheme. However, a
high debt/asset ratio (financial risk) coupled with a high variation in net farm income
(business risk) would increase a farmers total risk. In this situation, a consultant may advise
the client to invest in an IED scheme thus implying a positive relationship.
Due to the nature ofthe multiplicative term, multicollinearity was anticipated between the variable
R_DA and its component variables RISK and DA. The next section provides a brief background




The use of multiplicative tenns in disc~inantanalysis focuses on the issue of multicollinearity.
Critics have noted that multiplicative tenns usually exhibit strong correlations with the component
parts. Because multiplicative tenns can introduce high levels ofmulticollinearity, critics have often
recommended against their use (Jaccard et aI, 1990 p30). According to Gujarati (1999), in cases of
perfect and high multicollinearity, estimation and hypothesis testing about individual discriminant
coefficients in a multiple regression are not possible. The partial correlation coefficient technique
is commonly used in quantifying the strength of association between two variables. By using this
technique, multicollinearity between two variables can successfully be detected and preliminary
results can be extracted. Table 3.7 presents the partial correlations between main and interaction
variables. The enterprise variable (ENT) was retained to detennine its relationship with the index
of variation in net farm income variable (RISK).




-0.225 0.339* 0.028 1.000
1.000 0.266* 0.022 -0.225 1.000
0.673* 0.621* -0.005 0.055 0.673* 1.000
0.673* 0.621* -0.005 0.055 0.673* 1.000* 1.000
0.388* -0.535* -0.052 0.472* 0.388* -0.103 -0.103 1.000
Note: * signifies statistical significance at the 1% level of probability
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From Table 3.7 it is clear that multicollinearity exists between the interaction variable R_DA and
its component variables RISK and DA, with coefficients of0.621 and 0.673 respectively. Cronbach
(1987) suggested centering the independent variables, prior to forming the multiplicative term, as
a means of addressing the problem of multicollinearity (as cited by Jaccard et al. 1990 p31).
Following this technique, the independent variable scores were centered (ie. deviation scores were
formed) and the product ofthe centered scores was computed for each subject. Table 3.8 presents
the partial correlations between main and interaction variables using centered scores.




-0.225 0.339* 0.028 1.000
1.000* 0.266* 0.022 -0.225 1.000
0.013 -0.020 -0.002 0.017 0.013 1.000
0.013 -0.020 -0.002 0.017 0.013 1.000* 1.000
0.388* -0.535* -0.052 0.472* 0.388* -0.031 -0.031 1.00
Note: * signifies statistical significance at the 1% level of probability
From Table 3.8 it is evident that the mulkticollinearity that existed between the multiplicative term
R_DA and its component variables RISK and DA has been eliminated, with coefficients of 0.013
and -0.020 respectively. For the purpose ofdiscrimiant analysis, non-centered scores were used to
produce the results of the main effects model (Model 1) and centered scores were used to produce
the results of the interaction model (Model 2). As anticipated, the variables RISK and ENT were
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perfectly correlated. The results obtained by substituting RISK for ENT and vice versa in the
subsequent discriminant analysis would therefore be consistent, allowing one variable to be excluded
from the analyses. This would effectively remove the effects ofperfect collinearity. The enterprise
variable ENT was subsequently dropped and the index of variation in net farm income variable
RISK was retained for analysis purposes.
3.7 Preliminary results
Preliminary results can be extrapolated from the coefficients ofvariation calculated in Table 3.4 and
the partial correlation matrix presented in Table 3.8. According to Barry et al (1995 p31), the
coefficient ofvariation serves as an indicator ofthe amount ofrisk relative to the amount ofexpected
return. It is a measure ofthe amount ofrisk inherent in a particular venture or enterprise. The higher
the value, the more risky the venture/enterprise. The coefficients of variation calculated from the
original representative livestock, maize and diversified farm record data indicate that maize farmers
carry more risk (high of 2.630, low of 1.453) relative to livestock farmers (high of 1.886, low of
0.523), with diversified farmers carrying the least risk (0.303). It is worth noting that a maize farmer
with an intermediate value (1.963) is above a livestock farmer with a high value (1.886). These
results indicate the relative proportions of risk maize farmers experience relative to livestock and
diversified farmers, making the scheme more valuable to maize farmers relative to livestock and
diversified farmers.
The correlation coefficients for Y_N with DA, NFI and RISK were all statistically significant at the
1% level ofprobability, while the coefficient for 01 and~DA was not statistically significant. The
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signs of the coefficients all agree with a priori reasoning. The relative contribution of the DA
variable overshadows the relative contribution of the RISK variable, resulting in a negative
coefficient ofthe interactive term R_DA. The non-significant sign ofthe coefficient indicates that,
ceterisparibus, the study consultants would advise farmers to first reduce their debt before investing
in an IED scheme. In the study consultants' view, farmers with less leverage (debt/asset ratio),
higher net farm incomes and more variable net farm incomes are more likely to use an IED scheme.
The relative size of the explanatory coefficient estimates indicate that statistically, DA is the most
important determinant ofan IED scheme, followed by NFI and then RISK. An in-depth look at the




This chapter presents the results obtained from the questionnaire section ofthe survey, followed by
the results obtained in discriminant analysis. Responses to individual questions are presented in the
questionnaire section together with a statistical indication ofresponses to individual questions. Two
models are presented in the discriminant analysis section, followed by a brief discussion on the
results obtained. The discriminant function obtained separating potential users and non-users ofan
IED scheme is then presented and used to predict the potential membership of specific cases
(samples) selected from the original data set. These results are then tabulated and briefly discussed.
The chapter ends with an assessment of the discriminant analysis due to the violation of the
normality assumption.
4.1 Questionnaire section results
Responses to the individual questions are presented in Table 4.1. Most of the consultants agreed
with the concept of an IED scheme, and felt that it would be feasible in helping farmers to avoid
over-capitalising (purchasing more machinery and equipment than needed) during "good" cash flow
years, and in providing liquidity for use in "lean" times. By legally delaying payment oftax, farmers
could stabilise income and cash flows. All but one of the consultants would recommend an IED
scheme to their clients, but they would advise clients that were carrying forward large debt loads to
rather make debt repayments before investing in an IED.
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The Land Bank drought relief provision was highly recommended, but consultants suggested that
it should be available as an option to all farmers, not only livestock farmers. These farmers may
have no accumulated losses and so would have to pay much needed money as additional income tax
on forced livestock sales without the provision. The consultants supported replacing the Land Bank
drought relief provision with an IED scheme, as all farmers under any conditions would then have
access to potential risk management benefits. The Land Bank drought reliefprovision could further
be modified into an IED scheme, allowing farmers to invest surplus profits, not taxed, in "good"
years and not only when drought occurs - for instance, when a farmer must sell all or part ofhis land
and, therefore, has to reduce his livestock numbers.
Table 4.1: Sample consultants' responses to survey questions, 2000 (n=24)
Question 1 Feasibility of lED 92
Agree with lED concept 96
Question 2 Recommend lED to clients 96
Question 3 Recommend Land Bank drought relief provision (paragraph 13A) 96
Question 4 Replace Land Bank drought relief provision with an lED scheme 92
Question 5 Tax deferral perceived as a problem by SARS 75
Question 6 lED used with accelerated depreciation allowance provision (section 12B) 92
lED used with capital expenditure provision (paragraph 12(1)) 96
Question 7 lED used with the income averaging provision (paragraph 19(2)) 100
Question 8 Any disadvantages with an lED scheme 96
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According to 75 percent ofthe consultants, the SARS would consider the tax deferral implied by the
IED scheme as a problem. The 25 percent of consultants who felt that it would not be a problem
considered the amount involved would not be material relative to the total income tax collected by
the SARS. Consultants noted that a tax deferral was already implied by the Land Bank drought relief
provision, and, therefore, changing to an IED scheme would be similar. In addition, taxable income
is more "visible" with both schemes, which aids tax monitoring.
The consultants had mixed opinions about using an IED scheme in conjunction with the accelerated
depreciation allowance and capital expenditure provisions. Most agreed that both provisions should
stay in place if an IED is introduced, as capital assets are relatively costly to purchase. They
cautioned, however, that many farmers had misused these two provisions and over-capitalised in an
attempt to avoid tax. This had resulted in a number of farm bankruptcies.
All ofthe consultants supported using an IED scheme with the current income averaging provision.
Farmers not able to use the IED scheme due to cash flow problems would still be able to benefit
from income averaging. This provision leads to a lower rate of tax on taxable income, whereas an
lED scheme defers the tax liability and creates an incentive to save. For these reasons, the
consultants felt that what happens to the income averaging provision ifan IED scheme is introduced
would also influence whether or not a farmer would participate in an lED scheme.
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Implementing an IED scheme was seen as a benefit to all farmers, with only a few disadvantages
cited. Firstly, if income tax rates increase due to fiscal drag, the deferred liability may be greater
than ifthe farmer had paid the tax liability earlier. The administrative costs ofsetting up and staffing
such a scheme may be prohibitive, and it was suggested that the Land Bank drought relief scheme
with its present structures could be used to house an IED scheme, with only minor changes to the
Income Tax Act. Farmers who have not withdrawn funds within the IED time limit may also face
a large tax liability in the final year, whether they need the funds or not. As noted in Question 5, the
tax deferral implied by the scheme would be a possible concern for the SARS.
4.2 Discriminant analysis results
4.2.1 Discrimination between potential adopters and non-adopters of an lED scheme
All 24 tax consultants felt that the nine farm scenarios considered were realistic, implying that their
views were a good representation of what they would advise their clients. This, together with a
consistency rate of91 % achieved through the control scenario, ensured a realistic and consistent data
set for analysis purposes. Two discriminant models are presented in Table 4.2. Model 1 consists
of the main effects and Model 2 consists of the main effects with the interaction effect.
47
Table 4.2: Results of the discriminant models identifying the characteristics of potential





















Overall % correctly classified 94.3 94.3
Note: * signifies statistical significance at the 1% level ofprobability
The overall Chi-square value (significant at the 1% level of probability) in both models indicates
that, collectively, the explanatory variables in each model distinguish significantly between potential
adopters and non-adopters ofan IED scheme. The Wilks' Lambda in both models indicates a high
level ofdiscriminating power. Inaddition, the Eigenvalue (ratio ofbetween-groups to within-groups
sum of squares) and the Canonical correlation (measure of degree of association between the
discriminant scores and group membership) indicate good predictive models. Both models correctly
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classified 94% ofoverall cases. Due to the restrictions imposed by the statistical model, no hold-out
sample was used in determining classification rates.
The relationships (coefficient signs) between dependent and independent variables were in
accordance with a priori expectations and supported the preliminary results obtained from the
partial correlation matrix in Chapter 3. In Model 1, the debt/asset ratio (DA) was found to be the
most important variable (highest standardised coefficient) distinguishing betweenpotential adopters
and non-adopters ofan lED scheme. The negative sign ofthe variable indicates that, ceterisparibus,
farmers with lower debt/asset ratios are more likely to make use of an lED scheme. Farmers with
a high debt/asset ratio will most likely be advised to reduce their debt before investing in an lED
scheme. It is in any case a recommended strategy that farmers with high debt first repay their debt.
The second most important distinguishing variable was net farm income (NFI). The sign was
positive which confirms that, ceterisparibus, farmers with higher annual net farm incomes are more
likely to invest in an lED scheme. Farmers with a high net farm income are more likely to have the
resources to firstly, cover any existing debt, and then invest in an lED scheme. This supports the
view expressed by Hattingh (1986 p22) that wealthier farmers are more likely to make use ofan lED
scheme.
The third most important variable was that ofthe index ofvariation in net farm income (RISK). The
sign was positive indicating that, ceteris paribus, maize farmers with a high variation in net farm
income are more likely to invest in an lED scheme than livestock farmers with a low variation in net
farm income. This indicates that an lED scheme could act as a potential risk management strategy.
The fourth distinguishing variable listed was that of off-farm income (01). Even though the
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standardised coefficient was found to be non-significant, it was retained in the model as the sign of
the coefficient and its magnitude are of significance to the adoption of an lED scheme. The non-
significant coefficient estimate indicates that, ceteris paribus, off-fann income will most likely not
be invested in an lED. This implies there are no gains to be made in the misuse of the scheme as a
tax shelter. Alternative investment avenues outside agriculture (diversified investments) could be
a use of off-fann income where more gains could be made to provide the fanner with better risk
spreading.
In Model 2, the interaction variable was tested with the main variables. The main variables were all
in accordance with the results obtained in Model 1. The standardised coefficient of the interaction
variable (R_DA) was found to be non-significant but retained in the model to reveal its contribution
to the decision to adopt an lED scheme. The relative contribution of the debt variable (DA)
overshadows the relative contribution of the net farm income variability variable (RISK), forcing
the sign to be negative. The negative sign of the variable indicates that, ceteris paribus, maize
fanners with a high index ofvariation in net farm income carrying high debt are less likely to invest
in an lED. In the consultants' views, high variability in net farm income (business risk) coupled with
high debt (financial risk) may increase a fanners total risk but the farmer should first redeem the debt
before investing in an lED.
The discriminant function, obtained from Model 1, using unstandardised coefficients that separates
potential users and non-users of an lED scheme is presented below.
D j = - 0.978 - 2.249DA + 1.984NFI + 0.774RISK - 0.2201.. (4)
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In Model 1, high risk maize farmers (high index of net farm income variability) were compared to
low risk livestock farmers (low index ofnet farm income variability). The coefficients ofvariation
for seven farming types were calculated from the actual data obtained from the Department of
Agriculture (NDA, 2000) and presented to consultants. The following farming types were selected
for different risk classes (high, intermediate and low): maize, livestock and diversified (one class)
(see Table 4.3). By substituting the coefficients of variation for the RISK variable in the
discriminant function, all possible combinations of net farm income variability with farming type
could be exploited. Specific samples from the scenario data set were selected depicting different
combinations and levels ofthe explanatory variables. With the use ofthe discriminant function, the
potential membership ofa specific case (sample) could be predicted based on the discriminant score.
The off-farm income variable (01) in Model 1 was statistically non-significant and was therefore
retained with a low score (0) as it had no influence on the outcome of the discriminant scores.
Additionally, as the interaction effect in Model 2 was also statistically non-significant, no predictions
are presented for Model 2.
Table 4.3 presents selected samples with their respective discriminant scores (DJ The group
centroids were -1.241 and 1.562 for potential non-adopters and adopters respectively, yielding a
cutoff point of 0.161. A sample case yielding a discriminant score of less than 0.161 would be
classified as a potential non-adopter (N) and a discriminant score of greater than 0.161 would be
classified as a potential adopter (Y).
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Table 4.3:' Predicted membership of specific samples, as selected from a sample of SA
consultants, 2000 (n=192)
MH 0 0 1 2.630 3.042 Y
MI 0 0 1 1.963 2.525 Y
......




!2 ML 0 0 1 1.453 2.131 Y
~
LI 0 0 1 0.947 1.739 Y
LL 0 0 1 0.523 1.411 Y
D 0 0 1 0.303 1.241 Y
MH 0 0 0 2.630 1.058 Y
MI 0 0 0 1.963 0.542 Y
N LH 0 0 0 1.886 0.482 Y
,..;(
() ML 0 0 0 1.453 0.147 N0-~ LI 0 0 0 0.947 -0.245 N
LL 0 0 0 0.523 -0.573 N
D 0 0 0 0.303 -0.743 N
MH 1 0 1 2.630 0.793 y
MI 1 0 1 1.963 0.276 Y
M LH 1 0 1 1.886 0.217 y
~
() ML 1 0 1 1.453 -0.118 N0-~ LI 1 0 1 0.947 -0.510 N
LL 1 0 1 0.523 -0.838 N
D 1 0 1 0.303 -1.008 N
MH 1 0 0 2.630' -1.191 N
Ml 1 0 0 1.963 -1.708 N
'<t' LH 1 0 0 1.886 -1.767 N
,..;(
() ML 1 0 0 1.453 -2.102 N!2
~ LI 1 0 0 0.947 -2.494 N
LL 1 0 0 0.523 -2.822 N
D 1 0 0 0.303 -2.992 N
Note: MH - maize-hIgh fisk
MI = maize-intermediate risk









In Block 1 ofTable 4.3, various levels ofnet farm income variability (risk) are depicted with a high
level of net farm income, holding the remaining variables constant at low levels. The discriminant
scores (Dj) suggest that all these types of farmers will most likely make use of an lED scheme.
Farmers carrying little debt with a high net farm income have the resources to make use of the
scheme. The relative size of the discriminant scores indicate which farmer would most likely make
use ofthe scheme relative to other farmers. According to the results, more value is given to high risk
maize farmers, followed by intermediate risk maize farmers and then high risk livestock farmers.
Least value is given to diversified farmers. This ranking was expected as farmers facing more
business risk are more likely to invest in an lED scheme.
Block 2 depicts farmers with various levels of net farm income variability, holding the remaining
variables constant at low levels. The discriminant scores revealed that only high and intermediate
risk maize farmers, and high risk livestock farmers would most likely invest in an lED scheme. The
risk associated with maize farmers carrying low levels of net farm income variability, livestock
farmers carrying intermediate and low levels ofnet farm income variability, and diversified farmers
is not sufficient to justify the use of an lED scheme. This again supports the use ofan lED scheme
as a risk management tool as higher risk farmers are more likely to make use of the scheme.
In Block 3, farmers with various levels ofnet farm income variability are depicted with a high level
ofnet farm income and debt. According to the discriminant scores, the only likely users ofan lED
scheme under these conditions are high and intermediate risk maize farmers, and high risk livestock
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fanners. The positive effect of the net fann income and risk variable offsets the negative effect of
the debt/asset variable in these particular samples. In the remaining samples, the combined effects
of the risk and net fann income variable is too low to offset the debt/asset variable. Block 4 depicts
fanners with various levels of net fann income variability with a high level of debt, holding the
remaining variables constant at a low level. The discriminant scores suggest that all the fanners
depicted will most likely not make use of an lED scheme. The negative effect of the debt/asset
variable offsets the positive effect of the risk variable.
The results indicate that maize, livestock and diversified farmers carrying large amounts of debt
(>40%) are less likely to invest in an IED scheme. Amongst the high debt fanners, only high and
intermediate risk maize fanners, and high risk livestock fanners are most likely to make use of an
IED scheme. The relative contribution of the debt variable in the analyses indicates the importance
of this variable in distinguishing between potential adopters and non-adopters of an lED scheme.
Several studies revealed the leverage (debt/asset) ratio to be the most important determinant ofmaize
fann bankruptcies between 1970 and 1994 (Leslie and Darroch, 1993; De Jager and Swanepoel,
1994; Swanepoel et al., 1996). A later study by Swanepoel et al. (1998) indicated that the leverage
ratio was the most important determinant ofextensive beef fann bankruptcies over the same period
(1970 to 1994). From these studies, it is evident that profits and cash flow could be of concern in
the key livestock and crop sectors ofSouth Africa. The extent ofthis problem in the grain sector has
been addressed in a recent study where the financial position of the Northern and Southern grain
regions of South Africa was reviewed by du Toit (2001). It was reported that since 1998,694
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farmers in these regions have been sequestrated, with a further 271 farmers being sequestrated in
2001. Another study conducted by Esterhuizen et at. (2001) revealed the fmancial position of the
agricultural business sector. Bankruptcies almost doubled (0,4% in 1998 to 0,74% in 2000),59%
more loans have been rejected by agribusinesses since 1998, the debt recovery account has grown
by 22%, clients against whom action was taken increased by 63% with money involved increasing
by 255%, new entrants securing loans increased by 9% and the money involved in new loans
,
increased by 99%, indicating that more agricultural producers are dependant on loans. Unfavourable
and fluctuating climatic conditions, primarily in the summer crop areas of South Africa, were
identified as possible causes of this situation.
4.2.2 Assessment of the discriminant analysis results
Since the multivariate normality assumption was violated by the dichotomous nature of the
independent variables, the discriminant scores for the main effects model and interaction model were
estimated and presented by frequency tables and histograms. The discriminant scores estimated in
the main effects model for potential adopters and non-adopters of an IED scheme are presented in
Table 4.4/Figure 4.1 and Table 4.5/Figure 4.2 respectively. The discriminant scores estimated in the
interaction model for potential adopters and non-adopters ofan IED scheme are presented in Table
4.6/Figure 4.3 and Table 4.7/Figure 4.4 respectively.
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Table 4.4: Discriminant scores estimated in the main effects model for potential
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- 0.75 to - 0.26













Figure 4.1: Histogram for Table 4.4
56
Table 4.5: Discriminant scores estimated in the main effects model for potential
adopters of an lED scheme
Code Score
1 0.25 to 0.74
2 0.75 to 1.24
3 1.25 to 1.74
4 1.75 to 2.24
5 2.25 to 2.74






















Figure 4.2: Histogram for Table 4.5
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Table 4.6: Discriminant scores estimated in the interaction model for potential











- 3.25 to - 2.76
- 2.75 to - 2.26
- 2.25 to - 1.76
- 1.75 to - 1.26
- 1.25 to - 0.76
- 0.75 to - 0.26




















Figure 4.3: Histogram for Table 4.6
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Table 4.7: Discriminant scores estimated in the interaction model for potential
adopters of an lED scheme
Code Score
1 0.25 to 0.74
2 0.75 to 1.24
3 1.25 to 1.74
4 1.75 to 2.24
5 2.25 to 2.74













Figure 4.4: Histogram for Table 4.7
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The discriminant scores estimated for the main effects potential non-adopter model (Figure 4.1) and
the interaction potential non-adopter model (Figure 4.3) appear to be approximately normally
distributed, while the scores for the main effects potential adopter model (Figure 4.2) and the
interaction potential adopter model (Figure 4.4) are slightly positively skewed. In combination, the
discriminant scores for potential adopter and non-adopter groups appear to be approximately
normally distributed, thus, according to Lachenbruch (1975), rendering the test valid. The estimates
can thus be accepted with reasonable confidence. A classification rate of 100 percent for potential
adopters and 89.7 percent for potential non-adopters in both models, according to Klecka (1980),
indicates that the violation of the normality assumption was not very harmful, thus suggesting that
good predictive models were developed.
The questionnaire section of the survey revealed key issues regarding the potential use of an lED
scheme in South Africa. Discriminant analysis was used to determine which factors distinguish best
between potential adopters and non-adopters of an lED scheme. Conclusions and policy
implications are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The concept ofan IED scheme as a potential risk management tool to promote better cash flow and
thus stabilise farm income was well supported by the study consultants. An IED scheme could
reduce the incentive to over-capitalise in good years, and hence raise the long-term tax proceeds
from the farm sector. The consultants suggested that the averaging provision be used with an IED
scheme, implying that the in-out option will remain in place. Past experience with IED's in
Australia indicates that this combination has lead to misuse of the averaging provision as farmers
deliberately made IED deposits in low (below the moving average) income years in order to lower
their tax rates. This would support the recommendation that such misuse could be avoided by not
allowing farmers to make IED deposits in years when reported taxable incomes are below the five
year movmg average.
Replacing the Land Bank drought relief provision for livestock farmers with an IED scheme that
caters for all (livestock, crop and horticultural) farmers would reduce the costs of setting up and
staffmg the scheme, as present Land Bank structures could be used to house the scheme. Ifthe rule
to prevent the misuse of an IED scheme is imposed, livestock farmers will still be able to make
deposits during drought conditions as incomes will be above the moving average. An estimated
R227.2 million was deposited in the Land Bank drought relief scheme during the year 2000 by an
estimated 1178 depositors (Marais, 2000 as cited by Nieuwoudt and Howell, 2000). Deposits could,
therefore, be considerable if an IED scheme is adopted and caters for all types of farmers. Those
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farmers not able to make lED deposits due to cash flow problems could still use the income
averaging provision. Tax monitoring by the SARS will be greatly enhanced ifthe IED scheme caters
for all types of farmers. This advantage could, in part, offset the problem of tax deferral for the
SARS. The consultants may, however, be over-concerned with the issue of deferred taxes, since
experience with the Australian FMD scheme showed that significant tax savings from the use ofthe
scheme are comparatively rare. Furthermore, if tax rates increase due to fiscal drag, farmers may
pay more tax when they withdraw IED funds.
The accelerated depreciation allowance and capital expenditure provisions do enable farmers to
purchase capital items that are becoming increasingly costly to replace, but these provisions have
resulted in over-capitalisation, and, in cases, bankruptcy. The unwise use of these provisions
decreases a farmer's ability to manage risks, as it reduces liquidity. Investing in an lED scheme can
help a farmer to build up a reserve fund and increase his ability to manage risks by stabilising
income fluctuations. A high tax burden on the death ofa taxpayer using an lED scheme could result
because of estate duty, but this criticism also applies to the Land Bank drought relief provision.
Discriminant analysis supported the preliminary results, confirming that, in the study consultants'
view, farmers with less leverage (debt/asset ratios in the15%-30% range), higher net farm incomes
(>R300 000), and more variable net farm incomes, are more likely to invest in an lED scheme. The
significance ofthese variables indicates the value ofan IED scheme as a risk management tool, with
the debt/asset ratio being the primary indicator when considering investing in such a scheme.
Amongst the high debt farmers, high and intermediate risk maize farmers, and high risk livestock
farmers are most likely to make use ofan lED scheme. Study data showed that maize farmers faced
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. relatively more business risk than did livestock and diversified farmers, suggesting that maize
farmers may more readily invest in an IED scheme. Since maize farmers have been the main
beneficiaries of past government drought aid, this could mean reduced demands on government
drought relief funds in future if an IED scheme is introduced.
The tax provisions available to commercial farmers can help reduce the impact ofdisasters on farm
income, assist with abnormal receipts offarm income, assist in the purchasing ofcapital items which
are extremely costly, and reduce the tax liability oflivestock on hand, however, they do not provide
an incentive for farmers to become more liquid and better prepared to handle risk. An lED scheme
can be used to manage volatility at the total profit level, which is largely weather related, by
providing an incentive for farmers to become more liquid and better prepared to handle risk. An lED
scheme can potentially form an effective part ofa risk management strategy, especially if it is used
in conjunction with other strategies.
Results from the studies conducted on the causes ofmaize and extensive beeffarm bankruptcies, and
on the financial position of the Northern and Southern grain regions, suggest there may be an
. increase in debt in these sectors, but it is uncertain as to the extent ofthe problem. Bankruptcies and
sequestrations could merely reflect inefficient farmers leaving the agricultural sector or, alternatively,
the need for an alternative risk management tool. Farmers carrying large amounts of debt do not
necessarily have profit or cash flow problems as the returns on debt may be higher than the cost of
debt. These farmers are, however, more prone to cash flow problems. What the results do indicate
is that debt is concentrated in certain areas where cash flow may be a problem, and these areas
appear to be predominantly in the high risk maize and livestock regions ofSouth Africa. According
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to the results ofthe current study, it is these potentially high risk farmers (highly leveraged and high
income variability) that need to make use of an IED scheme. In the short run, highly leveraged
farmers with cash flow problems will most likely not be able to participate in an IED scheme.
Consultants need to advise clients on the relationship between net farm income, interest costs and
leverage levels for successful debt management. Only then can these farmers invest in an IED
scheme which can help manage the effects of a changing agricultural and macroeconomic policy
environment.
Results from the questionnaire section and discriminant analysis provided information regarding the
major criticisms of an IED scheme. Results from discriminant analysis indicated that farmers with
various levels of income variability and a high level of net farm income, holding the remaining
variables constant at low levels, will most likely make use of an IED scheme. Irrespective of the
income variability (risk) of a farmer, the model predicted that all farmers in the study would most
likely invest in an IED scheme. When various levels offarm income variability were depicted with
the remaining variable held constant at low levels, only three of the seven farmers depicted would
invest in an IED scheme. This supports the criticism that an IED scheme will favour farmers with
high net farm incomes. The questionnaire revealed that the SARS would consider the tax deferral
implied by the IED scheme as a problem, however, it was noted that a tax deferral was already
implied by the Land Bank drought reliefprovision and taxable income monitoring would be greatly
enhanced if an IED scheme caters for all types of farmers. These findings do support the criticism
that such a scheme impinges on the sound principle that revenue should be taxed in the year in which
it accrues, but provides the incentive of enhanced tax monitoring which could partly offset the
criticism.
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Results do not support the criticism that current averaging schemes enable farmers in good years to
make provisIon for poorer years by means ofa tax saving. All of the consultants supported the use
of an IED scheme with the current income averaging provision. It was noted that the current
averaging provision leads to a lower rate oftaxable income, whereas an IED defers the liability and
creates an incentive to save. The non-significance of the off-farm income coefficient in the
discriminant analysis indicates that off-farm income will most likely not be invested in an IED. This
suggests that there are no gains to be made in the misuse ofthe scheme as a tax shelter. This finding
does not support the criticism that an IED scheme offers considerable scope for tax sheltering in
respect of depositing off-farm income into IED's.
Practicing consultants have provided valuable information regarding the viability ofan IED scheme
for commercial farmers in South Africa and the results have provided information on the criticisms
of such a scheme in the past. An area of future research could involve determining where the debt
is predominantly concentrated in the commercial livestock and crop sectors ofSouth Africa, whether
cash flow is a problem in these areas, and the extent to which these farmers can make use ofan IED
scheme. This could give more scope as to the potential short run use ofan IED scheme. Additional
research could be to look at the possibility ofcommercial banks offering lED facilities. This could
reduce administration costs for the Land Bank, and may encourage more IED use as farmers would
have more choice as to where they invest. Lastly, a comprehensive evaluation of the Australian
FMD scheme should be made as this scheme has been successfully implemented with little financial
support from the government and could serve as a possible guideline to the implementation of an
IED scheme in South Africa.
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SUMMARY
Business and financial risk inherent in agriculture can lead to income variability, especially in the
grain sectors where droughts are common. In the past, the South African government response to
drought mainly involved providing drought relief, culminating in billions of rands worth of
assistance, mostly to maize farmers. The South African government has since changed this policy
and has encouraged farmers to manage risks themselves, in order to reduce demands on government
funds. One option currently being proposed to the National Department ofAgriculture (NDA, 1997)
is an Income Equalisation Deposit (lED) scheme. An lED scheme could provide a reserve fund in
which farmers invest part of their income during "good" years, and then are taxed on this income
only when they withdraw the money for use in "bad" years. An lED scheme would operate as a risk
management tool to stabilise farm incomes.
The concept of establishing an lED scheme in South Africa has previously been rejected for a
number ofreasons. The use of an lED scheme as a tax instrument to promote improved cash flow
and risk management has been considered by many, focusing largely on the tax implications ofthe .
scheme (Lamont, 1990; NDA, 1997 and Fuchs, 1999). More recently, the focus has been on the
economic feasibility ofsuch a scheme. Nieuwoudt and Howell (2000) evaluated the past criticisms
ofIED schemes and concluded that the lED scheme proposed to the NDA could be feasible in South
Africa, possibly replacing the drought reliefscheme for livestock farmers and being made available
to all farmers. This study complements Nieuwoudt and Howell's study by finding out whether
practicing tax consultants think an IED scheme would be viable for commercial farmers in South
Africa. The objectives of the study were two-fold. The first objective was to determine whether
there is a need for an lED scheme and, if there is a need, how the scheme should be implemented
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with regards to existing tax provisions available to commercial farmers. The second objective was
to determine what types of farmers are most likely to make use of an IED.
Fifty-two consultants based mainly in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and in the Maize Triangle and
surrounding areas (North-West Province, North-Eastern Free State and Mpumalanga), were surveyed
using a mail questionnaire comprising of a scenario and a questionnaire section. These areas were
selected to obtain the views ofconsultants that dealt with tax matters for a range of farm situations,
from relatively low risk livestock and diversified farmers in KZN (less variable net farm incomes),
to relatively high risk maize farmers (more variable net farm incomes) in the Maize Triangle and
adjacent regions.
The questionnaire section was compiled to obtain information on whether practicing tax consultants
think an IED scheme would be viable for commercial farmers in South Africa, whether they would
recommend it to their clients, and their perceptions ofhow it would fit with existing tax provisions
for farmers and, the tax deferral effects ofsuch a scheme. The scenarios were compiled to determine
what types of farmers are most likely to use an IED. Each consultant was asked to review nine
scenarios oftypical farms in the study regions and to decide whether they would recommend an IED
scheme for each scenario. Scenarios one to eight used in the analyses were constructed using a
statistical experimental design, with the ninth scenario serving as a control as a measure of
consistency between the consultants. These scenarios (farms) were depicted using four variables that
showed different levels (high, low and intermediate) offarm business leverage (debt/asset ratio), net
farm income, business risk (index of net farm income variability), and off-farm income, based on
representative livestock, maize and diversified farm record data supplied by the NDA (1999).
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Results from the questionnaire revealed that, in the consultants' view, an IED scheme could be
feasible, help farmers to avoid over-capitalising during years ofgood cash flow, and provide liquidity
in "lean" times. Most of them supported the recommendations that the Land Bank drought relief
provision (paragraph 13A) for livestock farmers could be replaced with an IED scheme that all
farmers could access. They also felt that the capital expenditure(paragraph 12(1)) and accumulated
depreciation allowance provisions (section 12B) available to farmers should remain in place and,
all of the consultants supported using an IED scheme with the current income averaging provision
(paragraph 19(2)). Implementing an IED scheme was seen as a benefit to all farmers, with only a
few disadvantages cited. Firstly, if income tax rates increase due to fiscal drag, the deferred liability
may be greater than ifthe farmer had paid the tax liability earlier. The administrative costs ofsetting
up and staffing such a scheme may be prohibitive, and it was suggested that the Land Bank drought
relief provision with its present structures could be used to house an IED scheme, with only minor
changes to the Income Tax Act. Farmers who have not withdrawn funds within the IED time limit
may also face a large tax liability in the final year, whether they need the funds or not. The tax
deferral implied by the scheme would be a possible concern for the South African Revenue Services.
Discriminant analysis was used to determine which factors distinguish best between adopters and
non-adopters ofan IED scheme. The independent variables (and their expected signs) which were
expected to distinguish IED scheme adopters from non-adopters included: a) debt/asset ratio (-), due
to the higher cost of borrowing than investing, it was expected that farmers with debt will redeem
debt first before investing in an IED scheme, b) off-farm income (-), it was hypothesised that higher
levels ofoff-farm income may indicate clients that have diversified investments and so would be less
likely to need an IED, c) net farm income (+), it was postulated that adopters would have higher net
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farm incomes (higher profits) as they would have the means to save, d) index ofvariation in net farm
income (+), it was hypothesised that an IED scheme would suite farms having a higher index ofnet
farm income variability as they are exposed to more business risk. Results of the analysis revealed
that all variables were in accordance with a priori expectations. The debt/asset ratio, net farm
income and index of net farm income variable were all statistically significant at the I% level of
probability, with the debt/asset ratio being the most important variable distinguishing between
adopters and non-adopters ofan IED scheme. Amongst the high debt farmers, high and intermediate
risk maize farmers, and high risk livestock farmers are most likely to make use of an IED scheme.
In order to cover all combinations of income variability with farming type, the coefficients of
variation for business risk (index ofnet farm income variability) were calculated using the original
representative livestock, maize and diversified farm record data supplied by the NDA (1999). The
discriminant function obtained from discriminant analysis was then used to determine the outcome
of different enterprise combinations with various levels of debt, off-farm income and net farm
income. This effectively allowed all combinations of income variability with farming type. The
coefficients calculated represented high, intermediate and low risk maize and livestock farmers, and
diversified farmers. All farmers (maize, livestock and diversified) would most likely invest in an
IED scheme if the net farm income variable is at a high level with the remaining variables held
constant at low levels. Farmers carrying little debt with a high net farm income have the resources
to make use ofthe scheme. High and intermediate risk (income variability) maize farmers, and high
risk livestock farmers would most likely invest in an IED scheme if the debt/asset ratio, net farm
income and off-farm income variables are held constant at low levels. The risk associated with low
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risk maize farmers, intermediate and low risk livestock farmers, and diversified farmers is not
sufficient to justify the use of an IED scheme. This signifies the use of an lED scheme as a risk
management tool as higher risk farmers (higher income variability) are more likely to use the
scheme. High risk maize farmers would be the only likely users of an IED scheme if the debt/asset
ratio and net farm income variables are held at high levels with the off-farm income variable at a low
level. The positive effect ofthe net farm income and risk variable offsets the negative effect ofthe
debt/asset variable in this particular sample. In the remaining samples, the combined effects of the
risk and net farm income variable is too low to offset the debt/asset variable. All farmers would
most likely not invest in an lED scheme if the debt/asset variable is at a high level with the
remaining variables held constant at low levels. The negative effect ofthe debt/asset variable offsets
the positive effect of the risk variable.
The tax provisions available to commercial farmers do not provide an incentive for farmers to
become more liquid and better prepared to handle risk. An IED scheme can be used to manage
volatility at the total profit level, which is largely weather related, by providing an incentive for
farmers to become more liquid and better prepared to handle risk. An IED scheme can potentially
form an effective part ofa risk management strategy, especially ifit is used in conjunction with other
strategies. Since maize farmers have been the main beneficiaries of past government drought aid,
this could mean reduced demands on government drought relief funds in future if an IED scheme
is introduced.
Results obtained from the questionnaire section and the disriminant analysis provided information
regarding the major criticisms ofan IED scheme in the past. Results supported the criticism that an
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IED scheme will favour farmers with high net farm incomes. Results also supported the criticism
that an IED scheme impinges on the sound principle that revenue should be taxed in the year in
which it accrues, but provided the incentive of enhanced tax monitoring which could partly offset
this criticism. The criticisms of the current averaging scheme enabling farmers in good years to
make provision for poorer years by means ofa tax saving, and an IED scheme offering considerable
scope for tax sheltering were, however, not supported by the results of the study.
To obtain more scope as to the potential short run use ofan IED scheme in South Africa, an area of
future research could involve determining where the debt is predominantly concentrated in the
livestock and crop sectors, and the extent to which these farmers could make use ofan IED scheme.
As a possible means to reduce administration costs for the Land Bank and encourage more IED use,
additional research could be to look at the possibility of commercial banks offering IED facilities.
Lastly, Austalia has successfully implemented a Farm Management Deposit Scheme wich operates
in a similar way to the proposed IED scheme. A comprehensive evaluation of the Australian FMD
scheme should be made as it could serve as a possible guideline to the implementation of an IED
scheme in South Africa.
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lED Scheme Questionnaire
This questionnaire and the proceeding study attempts to higWight factors that need to be considered
when assessing the viability of an Income Equalisation Deposit (IED) scheme for commercial
farmers in South Africa. An IED scheme has been proposed as a means to stabilise farm incomes.
An IED scheme would operate as a reserve fund into which farmers could invest part oftheir income
during "good" years, and would only be taxed on this income when they withdrew it. Savings can
be withdrawn during "bad" times. An IED scheme thus acts as a liquidity reserve and a means of
tax deferral for the farmer.
The aim ofthis questionnaire is to determine whether or not you would recommend that farmers use
an IED scheme, and under what circumstances you would recommend its use. Four factors have been
chosen to assess the viability ofan IED scheme, namely, debt/asset ratio; off-farm income; net farm
income and the index of variation in net farm income. A high (H), low (L) and intermediate (A)
figure for each variable is depicted. Please could you carefully evaluate the nine scenarios with
different values of these four factors, and then give your expert opinion on whether you would or
would not recommend the use of an IED scheme for each scenario. There are four scenarios for
livestock farmers, four scenarios for maize farmers and one scenario for a diversified farmer. We
would also be grateful if you could provide answers to eight key questions regarding the use and
implementation ofan IED scheme. On completion, could the survey kindly be posted back in the self
addressed envelope. Your expert opinion is of great importance to the success of the survey. An
executive summary of the research results and implications of the scheme will be posted to you on
completion of the study. For any enquiries, please contact John on 0829248617.
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SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. Do you consider the scenarios to be realistic? Do you consider an IED scheme to be feasible
and, do you agree with the concept of an IED scheme?
................................................................................................................................................
2. Would you recommend an IED scheme to your farmer clients? What percentage ofclients
do you think will use it?
................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
3. Would you recommend the Land Bank provision (paragraph 13A) with respect to drought






4. Would you support replacing the Land Bank provision mentioned in question 3 (for all







5. Do you perceive that the tax deferral implied by the lED will be considered a problem





6. Should the accelerated depreciation allowance provision (section 12B) and the capital
expenditure provision (paragraph 12(1)) be used in conjunction with an lED scheme, or






7. Ifan lED scheme is implemented, should it be used with or without the averaging provision
(paragraph 19(2))? Why?










Off-farm income (L) 0
NFI* (L) <R50 000
Index of variation (L) 1995 58
in NFI 1996 116






Off-farm income (H) >R20 000
NFI* (L) <R50 000
Index of variation (H) 1995 28
in NFI 1996 201






Off-farm income (H) >R20 000
NFI* (H) <R300 000
Index of variation (L) 1995 58
in NFI 1996 116






Off-farm income (L) 0
NFI* (H) <R300 000
Index of variation (H) 1995 28
in NFI 1996 201






Off-farm income (A) R10000
NFI* (A) R175 000
Index of variation (A) 1995 119
in NFI 1996 89






Off-farm income (H) >R20 000
NFI* (L) <R50 000
Index of variation (L) 1995 58
in NFI 1996 116






Off-farm income (L) 0
NFI* (L) <R50 000
Index of variation (H) 1995 28
in NFI 1996 201






Off-farm income (L) 0
NFI* (H) <R300 000
Index of variation (L) 1995 58
in NFI 1996 116






Off-farm income (H) >R20 000
NFI* (H) <R300 000
Index of variation (H) 1995 28
in NFI 1996 201






(H) = high value
(A) = average value
*NFI=Gross farm income less farm operating costs, eX~luding foreign factor costs
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Appendix C: Data set
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
1 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
2 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
3 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
4 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
5 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
6 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
7 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
8 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
9 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
10 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
11 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
12 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
13 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
14 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
15 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
16 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
17 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
18 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
19 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
20 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
21 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
22 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
23 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
24 1 1 1 1 2.630 0
25 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
26 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
27 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
28 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
29 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
30 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
31 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
32 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
33 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
34 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
35 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
36 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
37 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
38 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
39 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
40 1 1 0 1 2.630 0
41 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
42 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
43 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
44 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
45 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
46 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
47 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
48 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
49 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
50 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
51 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
52 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
53 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
54 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
55 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
56 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
57 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
58 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
59 1 0 1 0 2.630 0
60 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
61 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
62 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
63 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
64 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
65 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
66 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
67 1 0 1 0 2.630 0
68 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
69 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
70 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
71 1 1 0 1 2.630 0
72 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
73 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
74 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
75 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
76 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
77 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
78 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
79 1 1 1 1 2.630 0
80 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
81 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
82 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
83 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
84 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
85 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
86 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
87 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
88 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
89 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
90 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
91 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
92 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
93 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
94 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
95 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
96 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
97 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
98 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
99 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
100 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
101 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
102 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
103 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
104 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
105 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
106 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
107 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
108 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
109 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
110 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
111 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
112 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
113 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
114 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
115 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
116 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
117 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
118 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
119 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
120 1 1 1 1 2.630 0
121 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
122 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
123 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
124 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
125 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
126 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
127 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
128 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
129 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
130 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
131 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
132 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
133 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
134 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
135 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
136 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
137 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
138 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
139 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
140 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
141 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
142 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
143 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
144 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
145 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
146 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
147 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
148 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
149 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
150 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
151 1 1 1 1 2.630 1
152 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
153 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
154 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
155 1 0 1 0 2.630 0
156 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
157 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
158 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
159 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
160 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
161 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
162 0 1 0 0 0.523 0
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E DA 01 NFI RISK YN
163 1 0 1 0 2.630 0
164 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
165 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
166 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
167 1 1 0 1 2.630 0
168 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
169 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
170 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
171 1 0 0 0 2.630 1
172 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
173 0 1 0 1 0.523 0
174 0 0 0 1 0.523 1
175 1 1 1 1 2.630 0
176 1 0 1 1 2.630 1
177 0 0 0 0.523 0
178 0 0 0 0 0.523 0
179 1 1 1 0 2.630 0
180 1 0 1 0 2.630 1
181 0 0 1 1 0.523 1
182 0 1 1 1 0.523 0
183 1 0 0 1 2.630 1
184 1 1 0 1 2.630 1
185 0 1 1 0 0.523 0
186 0 0 1 0 0.523 0
187 1 1 0 0 2.630 0
188 1 0 0 0 2.630
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Replication 1:
Scenario Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
1 11112 12112 21112 22112
2 22112 21112 12112 11112
3 22121 21121 12121 11121
4 11121 12121 21121 22121
5 12212 11212 22212 21212
6 21212 22212 11212 12212
7 21221 22221 11221 12221
8 12221 11221 22221 21221
Replication 2:
Scenario Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
1 11112 12112 21112 22112
2 22112 21112 12112 11112
3 21121 22121 11121 12121
4 12121 11121 22121 21121
5 22212 21212 12212 11212
6 11212 12212 21212 22212
7 12221 11221 22221 21221
8 21221 22221 11221 12221
Replication 3:
Scenario Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
1 11112 12112 21112 22112
2 21112 22112 11112 12112
3 12121 11121 22121 21121
4 22121 21121 12121 11121
5 22212 21212 12212 11212
6 12212 11212 22212 21212
7 21221 22221 11221 12221
8 11221 12221 21221 22221
Treatment factors are listed in the order: AB C D E
Where: A = Debt/Asset ratio (1 = low, 2 = high)
B = Annual Off-farm income (1 = low, 2 = high)
C = Annual Net farm income (1 = low, 2 = high)
D = Index of variation in net farm income (1 = low, 2 = high)
E = Type of farming (1 = maize, 2 = livestock)
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